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LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE AERONAUTICAL
CHARTS
DAVID L. ABNEY*
0 NE OF THE MOST insidious dangers facing air
travellers is an inaccurate aeronautical chart. Among
the aerial crashes of past decades, many can be attributed
to flight* and navigational aids which steered pilots into
unmarked obstructions or erroneously promised safe and
adequate landing approaches and facilities at the pro-
posed destination. All too often, the maps and charts
which should have guaranteed safety have instead engen-
dered tragedy. The two primary suppliers of aeronautical
charts in this country are the national government and
Jeppesen Sanderson, a subsidiary of the Times Mirror
Company ("Jeppesen"). There are special problems in es-
tablishing the culpability of either the United States or a
private chartmaker for an allegedly unsound chart,
although many of the defenses raised by each are similar.'
CASES AGAINST CHARTMAKERS
From its headquarters in Englewood, Colorado, Jep-
pesen provides enroute area and approach charts and
electronic flight information for the Western Hemisphere
and Pacific regions. The Jeppesen office in Frankfurt,
* David L. Abney completed his legal education at the University of Arizona,
College of Law in 1983 and is now an associate with Streich, Lang, Weeks &
Cardon in Phoenix, Arizona.
I See generally McCowan, Liability of the Chartmaker, 47 INS. CouNs. J. 359 (1980)
(examination of potential liability of publishers of aviation instrument approach
charts).
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West Germany supplies similar items for Europe, Asia,
the Middle East, and Africa.2 Enroute charts display large
geographic segments - several states or so in size - and
flight paths or airways. Area charts show regions around
major metropolitan areas and the applicable airways. Ap-
proach charts (or "plates") portray runways and the verti-
cal and horizontal coefficients of the runway approach
paths.3
Most of the litigation against Jeppesen has centered on
its approach and landing charts. Jeppesen makes landing
charts for every commercial airport in the United States.
They are used by every certificated and uncertificated air
carrier and by most private pilots.4 The Federal Aviation
Administration designs, tests, and promulgates standard
airport instrument approach procedures, 5 which Jeppesen
then converts into its own unique format:
Jeppesen approach charts depict graphically the instru-
ment approach procedure for the particular airport as that
procedure has been promulgated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) after testing and administrative ap-
proval. The procedure includes all pertinent aspects of the
approach such as directional heading, distances, minimum
altitudes, turns, radio frequencies and procedures to be
followed if an approach is missed. The specifications pre-
scribed are set forth by the FAA in tabular form. Jeppesen
acquires this FAA form and portrays the information
therein on a graphic approach chart. This is Jeppesen's
"product."...
Each chart portrays graphically two views of the proper
approach. The top portion is the "plan" view, depicted as
if one were looking down on the approach segment of the
flight from directly above. The bottom portion depicts the
"profile" view, presented as a side view of the approach
with a descending line depicting the minimum allowable
2 JEPPESEN WORLDWIDE FLIGHT INFORMATION CATALOG (1986).
- Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1983).
4 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94, 96 (D. Nev.
1978).
Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985).
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altitudes as the approach progresses. The plan view is re-
garded as a superior method of presenting course and
course changes; the profile view as a superior method of
presenting altitude and altitude changes. Each chart thus
conveys information in two ways: by words and numbers,
and by graphics.6
As a matter of customary practice, most Jeppesen ap-
proach charts have the same or roughly the same scale for
both the plan and profile views.7
Of the six published cases in which plaintiffs have at-
tempted to hold Jeppesen liable for allegedly misleading
aerial charts, the chartmaker has prevailed in only two.
While the recovery theories have ranged from breach of
warranty to negligence, the greatest success has come
under strict product liability. In every instance, Jeppesen
has litigated the case vigorously and appealed any adverse
decision. The results have been strenuous legal battles
that raged for many years.
A good example of Jeppesen's determination is Aetna
Casualty v. Jeppesen, a case which spanned over seventeen
years and six reported opinions.8 In Aetna, a Bonanza Air-
lines plane crashed in 1964 while landing in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The survivors of the crew sued Jeppesen, assert-
ing that the crash was caused by a defective approach
chart. The jury returned a verdict of liability. 9 When the
airline insurer, Aetna Casualty and Surety, subsequently
settled the wrongful death actions brought by representa-
6 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341-42 (9th Cir.
1981).
7 Id. at 342.
8 A Jeppesen motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was the first published
decision. Jeppeson [sic] & Co. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 83 Nev. 329, 431
P.2d 260 (1967). After Aetna, the airline insurer, settled some of the wrongful
death actions, the focus shifted to indemnity issues. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Jeppeson [sic] & Co., 344 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Nev. 1972) (federal jurisdiction
granted); 440 F. Supp. 391 (D. Nev. 1977) (denial of motion to dismiss based on
statute of limitations); 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977)(estoppel issues decided
against Jeppesen); 463 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1978) (merits of indemnity), vacated,
642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981)(remanded for reapportionment of damages
although determination of defect in chart approved).
11 344 F. Supp. at 1383.
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tives of passengers killed in the crash, a protracted dis-
pute arose between Aetna and Jeppesen over the proper
indemnity apportionment of damages.' 0 The existence of
a flaw in the Jeppesen chart was the one issue decided
early and affirmed throughout the proceedings.
Although they proceeded in a conclusory fashion, the
courts in Aetna found the chart defective within the mean-
ing of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."
Even though most Jeppesen approach charts use roughly
the same visual scale for the plan and profile views of an
approach, a fact that a pilot and navigator would come to
take for granted, the Las Vegas chart was quite different:
The "defect" in the chart consists of the fact that the
graphic depiction of the profile, which covers a distance of
three miles from the airport, appears to be drawn to the
same scale as the graphic depiction of the plan, which cov-
ers a distance of 15 miles. In fact, although the views are
the same size, the scale of the plan is five times that of the
profile. 12
The chartmaker was unsuccessful in its arguments that
the two graphic scales were not normally similar, that the
Bonanza crew could not reasonably have detrimentally re-
lied on such a correlation in their final approach, and that
the legend on the chart adequately explained the differing
scales by means of words and figures. The appellate court
held these factors insufficient to make the chart safe for its
intended use:
10 See supra note 8.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it was sold. (2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies
although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought tlte product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
12 642 F.2d at, 342.
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While the information conveyed in words and figures on
the Las Vegas approach chart was completely correct, the
purpose of the chart was to translate this information into
an instantly understandable graphic representation. This
was what gave the chart its usefulness - this is what the
chart contributed to the mere data amassed and promul-
gated by the FAA. It was reliance on this graphic portrayal
that Jeppesen invited.'"
The trial judge found that the Las Vegas chart "radi-
cally departed" from Jeppesen's usual presentation of
graphics in its other charts. The court further held that
the conflict between the information conveyed by words
and numbers and the information conveyed by graphics
rendered the chart unreasonably dangerous and a defec-
tive product. 14 Interestingly, Jeppesen revised the Las
Vegas chart after the accident and conformed the scale on
the profile view with the plan view.' 5
The judicial conclusion that the Jeppesen chart was a
"product" for purposes of Section 402A strict liability was
never seriously challenged in the Aetna cases. Once the
plaintiffs established that the chart was a proximate cause
of the crash, the burden of proof shifted to Jeppesen "to
prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged prod-
uct or its design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design."' 16 The chartmaker was unable to establish
that the benefits of using different scales on one chart
could outweigh the extraordinary dangers of a crash
posed by the misleading product. 17
Jeppesen was more fortunate in Times Mirror Co. v.
Sisk,' 8 a 1978 decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals.
The case arose from the crash of a Pan American 707
cargo jet into Mount Kamunay on the approach path to
13 Id.
14 Id.
-463 F. Supp. at 96.
6 Id. at 95. The district court followed the approach outlined in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
17 463 F. Supp. at 95-97.
- 122 Ariz. 174, 593 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1978).
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Manila International Airport in the Philippines. The jet
was following a route approved by the Philippine govern-
ment and depicted by Jeppesen on one of its standard
graphic approach charts. Pan American management was
aware of the route but had not discussed it with the Philip-
pine government. The pilot not only misinterpreted his
distance from the airport as he descended, but also veered
to the left. As a result, he guided the aircraft into the
mountain, killing everyone aboard. The Jeppesen ap-
proach chart did not show the presence of Mount
Kamunay at all.' 9
The survivors and Pan Am sued Jeppesen, alleging that
the incomplete chart was the proximate cause of the disas-
ter. The recovery theories were strict product liability
under Section 402A, product misrepresentation under
Section 402B, 20 and breach of the warranty of fitness
under the Uniform Commercial Code.2 ' The jury ren-
dered a unanimous verdict in favor of Jeppesen on all
counts. The trial judge, however, accepted the plaintiffs'
position and granted judgment non obstante veredicto. 22
Writing for the appellate panel, Judge Howard set aside
the judgment n.o.v. and ordered the trial court to enter
judgment in favor of the chartmaker.23 Judge Howard
had "serious misgivings" as to whether this was truly a
19 Id. at 175-77, 593 P.2d at 925-27.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965) provides:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by
him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chat-
tel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even
though (a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and (b) the
consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
21 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 4-2-314(2), 4-2-315 (1974). The parties stipulated
before trial that Colorado law would control liability and Arizona law would gov-
ern damages. This approach was justifiable as to Colorado since it was the place
of publication of the chart. 122 Ariz. at 175, 593 P.2d at 925.
22 122 Ariz. at 175, 593 P.2d at 925.
23 Id. at 180, 593 P.2d at 930.
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products liability case at all,2 4 although reversal came on
the narrow issue that the original verdict was sufficiently
supportable to be immune from judgment n.o.v. 25 Even if
the chart were considered a defective product, the court
concluded that the pilot was so far off track that the chart
was not the actual cause of the crash. 6
Several years later, in Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,27 the
court specifically found a Jeppesen chart to be a product 28
which was indeed defective and the direct cause of a fatal
accident. In Saloomey the pilot of a small private plane at-
tempted a full instrument landing at a West Virginia air-
field. The field had equipment which would inform the
pilot if he were on the proper flight path but no device to
give the glide altitude. The pilot would know if he were
lined up with the airport, but not how high he was on ap-
proach. The plane was equipped with all the electronic
gear needed for a full instrument landing and a Jeppesen
area chart which falsely portrayed the airfield as having a
complete instrument landing system. The attempt to land
in reliance on the presence of a full instrument landing
complex ended abruptly when the plane descended too
far too fast and crashed into a ridge. 9
The estates brought diversity actions against Jeppesen
which were consolidated for trial in Connecticut federal
district court, claiming negligence, breach of warranty and
strict products liability. As in almost all interstate aviation
accidents, the court immediately faced a thorny choice of
law problem. The laws of Colorado, Connecticut and
West Virginia all potentially applied to the dispute, and
24 Id. at 177, 593 P.2d at 927.
25 Id. at 178, 593 P.2d at 928.
211 Id. at 179, 593 P.2d at 929.
27 The district court opinion bears the appellation of Halstead v. United States,
535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983). The plaintiffs had originally claimed that federal air traf-
fic controllers were also negligently responsible for the crash, but the district
court dismissed those claims after a bench trial found no proximate cause. 707
F.2d at 673 n.3.
21 535 F. Supp. at 791.
219 707 F.2d at 672-74.
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each significantly differed from the others. Connecticut
and Colorado allowed strict products liability; West Vir-
ginia did not.30 West Virginia limited recovery to $10,000
for the wrongful death itself and $100,000 for special
damages and monetary losses.3 Colorado law allowed a
survivor who was not a widow, widower, minor child, or
dependent mother or father of the decedent to recover no
more than $45,000.32 Connecticut was the most gener-
ous, permitting recovery for the value of the decedent's
life as well as relevant special damages. 33 The legally sig-
nificant factual relationships to the crash also varied
among the states. West Virginia was the physical location
of the disaster. Connecticut was the domicile of the dece-
dents. 4 Colorado was Jeppesen's state of incorporation
and principal place of business, as well as the place where
Jeppesen sold the chart. 5
In order to determine the governing law, federal prece-
dent required the application of Connecticut conflict of
laws rules. 36 In tort actions, Connecticut courts had tradi-
tionally followed lex loci delicti, the law of the place of
injury, meaning that the restrictive law of West Virginia
would control.3 7 Many jurisdictions had already aban-
doned the superannuated lex loci delicti approach in
favor of applying the law of the forum having the most
significant relationship to the parties and the tortious oc-
currence, the rule embodied in Section 145 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 8 Moreover, the new
535 F. Supp. at 786.
Id. at 785.
32 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1973); 535 F. Supp. at 786 n.3.
3 535 F. Supp. at 785.
.4 707 F.2d at 676.
4'. Id.
- Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491 (1941).
.7 707 F.2d at 674.
Is 535 F. Supp. at 787. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145
states:
(1) the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with re-
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standard would give flexibility to efficiently handle con-
temporary transportation mishaps:
Invocation of the lex loci delicti rule in aviation-generated
wrongful death actions often produces unpredictable and
undesirable results; the locale of injury may well have no
connection to other relevant factors such as the parties'
domiciles or residences, their places of incorporation,
their principal places of business, or the location of the
wrongful conduct.
The Restatement (Second) approach recognizes this inher-
ent unpredictability and ameliorates it by including the
place of injury in a choice-of-law analysis which also exam-
ines the relationship and other contacts between the
parties .
District Judge Eginton determined that the Connecticut
spect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the par-
ties is centered.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 145 (1971).
The court noted that these contacts are to be evaluated according to their rela-
tive importance with respect to the particular issue. 535 F. Supp. at 787 n.5.
Section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rel-
ative interests of those states in the determination of the partic-
ular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971).
.- 707 F.2d at 674-76.
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courts were ready to accept the Restatement (Second) test.4 °
An analysis of the situation led to the conclusion that Col-
orado was the state with the most significant overall rela-
tionship to the accident. 4' The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed, observing that Jeppesen could
hardly "contend that the application of Colorado substan-
tive law to actions involving alleged defects in those charts
was unforeseeable, unpredictable, or fortuitous. "42
Having decided that Colorado substantive tort law con-
trolled the action, the court still had to ascertain if the
Colorado doctrine of strict products liability under Sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was applica-
ble. Jeppesen asserted that its approach chart was "a
service rather than a product and that the paper the map
was printed on was merely the method by which the infor-
mation was conveyed to subscribers. 4 3 Analogizing its
charts to the services given by doctors to their patients or
architects and engineers to their clients, Jeppesen claimed
it was not subject to strict products liability. 44 The plain-
tiffs argued that the chart was "a tangible product sold by
a corporation whose business is the mass manufacture
and distribution of thousands of such products."' '4 5
Judge Eginton systematically considered the nature of
the Jeppesen chart:
This court will not make any automatic or sweeping classi-
fication. Whether a transaction involving the sale of a map
constitutes the rendition of a professional service or the
sale of a tangible product poses a difficult question of se-
mantics since there is an element of service in all "goods"
40 535 F. Supp. at 788. The approach taken by the federal court was severely
criticized by one commentator as an "intrusive prediction that will tend to limit
the role of the Connecticut court in developing conflicts law." Note, Prediction by
Federal Courts - A Self-Fufilling Prohpecy?: Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 17 CONN. L.
REV. 415, 416 (1985).
4 535 F. Supp. at 789. A similar analysis established that Colorado law con-
trolled the damages and warranty issues. 535 F. Supp. at 791-95.
42 707 F.2d at 676.




whether maps or consumer durables. All require some
skilled service in initial design as well as in the transforma-
tion of raw materials into finished product.
4 6
He noted analogous labor law cases holding that plans,
maps and plats could be "goods," as well as the Restate-
ment intent that Section 402A would place special liability
on those marketing mass-distribution defective products
to the general public.4 7
The presence of some professional skill in the creation
of an informational chart did not preclude subjectingJep-
pesen to strict products liability:
Given that Jeppesen mass produced and distributed its
charts, its activity comes within the scope of the rationale
of § 402A and should not be insulated from a strict stan-
dard of liability by virtue of metaphysical and semantic
quibbling.
If suitable for mass marketing, the information is in some
sense a fungible good for which the manufacturer placing
it on the market must assume responsibility.
... Jeppesen mass produced and distributed thousands of
charts on the aviation market. Implicit in their presence
on the market was the representation that the purchaser
could rely on their information safely. Exposing defend-
ant Jeppesen's conduct to strict products liability is thus
entirely appropriate.4 8
The appellate court concurred that strict liability for the
approach chart was reasonable:
By publishing and selling the charts, Jeppesen undertook
a special responsibility, as seller, to insure that consumers
will not be injured by the use of the charts; Jeppesen is
entitled - and encouraged - to treat the burden of acci-
dental injury as a cost of production to be covered by lia-
bility insurance .... This special responsibility lies upon
Jeppesen in its role as designer, seller and manufacturer.49
46 Id.
4 Id. at 790-91.
48 Id. at 791.
49 707 F.2d at 676-77.
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The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict for the
plaintiffs on all three theories of liability - negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict products liability.50
The "product" versus "service" issue was never even
reached in the seven lawsuits filed against Jeppesen that
arose from the Soviet destruction of Korean Air Lines
Flight 007 in September of 1983. 5 ' The complaints al-
leged negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability,
contending that the Jeppesen flight route charts used by
the KAL crew "did not contain a warning explicitly noting
the possible consequences of straying over Soviet terri-
tory and that the absence of an explicit warning was negli-
gence, resulting in an 'unreasonably dangerous' product
being released into the stream of commerce. '52 The
plaintiffs also claimed that the "Airspace Restricted Ar-
eas" portion of the chart should have specifically had a
"Danger" or "Warning" designation for the area where
the Soviet Union shot the airplane down.5 3 These argu-
ments were based primarily on the fact that United States
Defense Department charts for the region gave a definite
caution that intrusion into Soviet airspace could result in
attack without warning. 54
The district court granted Jeppesen's motion to dismiss
the case for failure to state an actionable claim. The court
found that Jeppesen had no duty to place warnings on its
charts identical to those used on military maps, implying
that Jeppesen's admonition on its chart was sufficient as a
matter of law.55 Although Jeppesen had argued that the
intentional Soviet act was an unforeseeable superseding
Id. at 674, 679.
5' In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 619
(D.D.C. 1984).
52 Id. at 620.
53 Id.
54 Id.
5-' The warning on the Jeppesen chart read: "NAVIGATIONAL WARNING -
Pilots flying Northern Route between United States and Japan avoid approaching




cause, the court held that there had never been any proxi-
mate cause related to the chart that could be superseded:
Since there must be a causal connection between the De-
fendant's alleged omission and the harm to the Plaintiffs'
decedents, the Plaintiffs must be able to show a connec-
tion between the wording of the warning and the intrusion
into Soviet airspace. However, Plaintiffs here cannot claim
that theJeppesen chart caused the flight crew to do or fail
to do anything which lead [sic] KAL 007 off its assigned
course. Plaintiffs do not allege that the enroute chart was
misleading or inaccurate in setting the flight path for KAL
007. They do not allege that the chart incorrectly de-
picted the land masses or bodies of water over which KAL
007 flew.
[T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot, under any set of
circumstances, demonstrate a causal link between what
happened to KAL 007 and the claims that the Jeppesen
warning was inadequately worded. There being no "but
for" cause attributable to Jeppesen, the issue of "super-
seding cause" need not be reached.56
Two reported cases against the chartmaker appeared in
1985. Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.57 concerned the crash of
a Lockheed L- 1329 Jet Star on approach to Adirondack
Airport near Lake Saranac, New York. The plane hit the
side ofJohnson Hill at 2140 feet while attempting to land
on a snowy night in December of 1972. Although John-
son Hill was 2257 feet high and constituted the highest
point in the crash vicinity, it was not shown on the Jep-
pesen instrument approach chart. The highest hill de-
picted was only 1991 feet in elevation. The impact
demolished the plane and killed all of its occupants. The
jet owner sued Jeppesen for breach of warranty, negli-
gence, and strict products liability. 58 Jeppesen claimed
that the crew caused the catastrophe by flying too low in
." Id. at 620-21.
57 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1985).
- Id. at 473, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
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poor weather. 59 The trial judge refused to instruct the
jury on the strict products liability theory, and the verdict
was for Jeppesen on the warranty and negligence
counts.60
Writing the opinion for the California Court of Appeals
for the Second District, Associate Justice Gates agreed
with the federal decisions classifying an approach chart as
a "product.' Classifying the chart in this fashion would
serve the important California goals of protecting the
hapless victims of product flaws and spreading the com-
pensation costs throughout society.62 The trial judge had
acknowledged that the chart was indeed a product, but
decided that strict liability applied only to "items whose
physical properties render them innately dangerous, e.g.,
mechanical devices, explosives, combustible or flammable
materials, etc." 63 Justice Gates disagreed:
[A]lthough a sheet of paper might not be dangerous, per
se, it would be difficult indeed to conceive of a salable
commodity with more inherent lethal potential than an aid
to aircraft navigation that, contrary to its own design stan-
dards, fails to list the highest land mass immediately sur-
rounding a landing site.64
Moving to the defectiveness question, Justice Gates
noted that a plaintiff could establish that a product was
defectively designed if it either (1) failed to meet ordinary
consumer expectations "when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner" or (2) the benefits of the
suspect design did not outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.6 5 Jeppesen had indicated in the chart
legend that the highest obstructions in the immediate area
Id. at 473-74, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
Id. at 473-80, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 70-74.
61 Id. at 474, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
62 Id. at 474-75, 216 Cal Rptr. at 70-71.
- Id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
- Id. at 476, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
w, Id. at 476, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 72. This follows the doctrine of Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228
(1978). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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of the airport would be depicted, and Jeppesen's own pro-
duction operations manual also required the marking of
the highest points.6 6 Once the plaintiff had presented suf-
ficient circumstantial evidence from which to infer that the
chart omission of Johnson Hill was a proximate cause of
the crash, the burden shifted to the chartmaker to show
that the product was not defective. Factors to be consid-
ered were "the gravity of the danger posed by the chal-
lenged design, the likelihood that such danger would
occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative de-
sign, the financial cost of an improved design, and the ad-
verse consequences to the product and to the consumer
that would result from an alternative design. '6 7
Justice Gates plainly thought that Jeppesen could not
justify the incomplete presentation on the Adirondack ap-
proach chart:
Here the inclusion of Johnson Hill on respondent's chart
in accordance with its own design rules apparently could
have been accomplished with ease at negligible cost. Re-
spondent, of course, has a legitimate concern that its
charts not become too congested, a result which could it-
self create substantial safety problems. It does not appear,
however, that such concern would have prevented the in-
clusion of Johnson Hill with or without the elimination of
the lower Hill 1991; in fact, the FAA mandated its depic-
tion following this tragic accident. 68
Finally, Jeppesen argued that the implied jury instruc-
tions covered the substance of the strict liability doctrine
and that the crew's negligence was a total bar to recovery.
Justice Gates held that the implied warranty instructions
did not adequately explain the requirement that a manu-
facturer take reasonable precautions to minimize harm
arising from foreseeable misuse or abuse of its product. 69
(w 170 Cal. App. 3d at 476-77, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
117 Id. at 478, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237). See supra notes 16 and 65.
- 170 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
,i! Id. at 479, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
1986] 337
338 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
Moreover, Justice Gates would not preclude a strict liabil-
ity claim even if the crew had negligently operated the air-
craft while relying upon the map's inadequate
representations:
To the degree this information was erroneous or mislead-
ing, it exposed to substantial danger any pilot who, for
whatever reason, descended below the federally pre-
scribed minimum altitudes in effect in the vicinity of the
Adirondack Airport. It is obvious, of course, that failure
to abide by these height regulations might constitute neg-
ligence. Nonetheless, it cannot be said as a matter of law
that it was unforeseeable a pilot might still engage in such
conduct in an attempt to effect a nighttime landing during
adverse weather conditions at an airport which had non-
precision approaches and no control tower, as was the
case at Adirondack Airport. It is notable that the instant
crash occurred while the aircraft was being flown at an alti-
tude sufficient to clear Hill 1991, the highest obstruction
in the vicinity of the accident site shown on respondent's
chart. 70
We do not intend by the foregoing discussion to suggest
that the question of the crew's alleged negligence may not
have determinative significance. Comparative fault princi-
ples have been extended to actions founded on strict lia-
bility. However, for purposes of apportionment,
appellant's conduct is to be compared not to the respon-
dent's conduct, but to its product.7'
Based upon the above mentioned rationale, the judgment
was reversed and the case remanded for proceedings in
accord with strict liability concepts.72
Plaintiffs were also successful against Jeppesen in
Brocklesby v. United States,73 a case involving the crash of a
World Airways DC-8 cargo plane on approach to the Cold
70 Id. at 477, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 480, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
72 Id.
7, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985). The case was discussed in Abramson &
Smith, Strict Liability for Publisher of Defective FAA Approach Procedure, 15 CAL. TRIAL
LAw. Assoc. FORUM 276 (1985)[herinafter cited as FORUM].
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Bay, Alaska airport in 1973. The disaster killed all six
crew members and destroyed the aircraft and its contents.
Although the National Transportation Safety Board attrib-
uted the crash to pilot error, a long and complex course of
discovery against the federal government and the chart
publisher, Jeppesen, revealed the following probable
causes of the accident: (1) a defective approach procedure
promulgated by the government and accurately portrayed
and published byJeppesen, which lacked a transitional arc
30 or 40 miles from the airport which would have kept the
airplane above and away from the terrain, until the air-
plane had reached the specific compass point from which
it could turn inbound over water for a direct approach and
landing at the airport; (2) negligent traffic control advice
to the airplane from the FAA facility at Anchorage; (3)
transmission of inaccurate navigation signals from the
Cold Bay Airport, causing cockpit instruments to indicate
mistakenly that the airplane was located over water, when
in fact it was flying over mountainous terrain.74
The survivors and the owner of the cargo plane sued
Jeppesen and the United States Government, seeking
both property and wrongful death damages. Since Jep-
pesen had accurately portrayed in its graphic form an ad-
mittedly flawed and dangerous instrument approach
procedure developed by the federal government, Jep-
pesen was entitled to tort indemnity against the United
States. The company chose to forego a tort suit and made
a "secret contractual indemnity agreement" with its co-
defendant. 75 In a bifurcated trial, ajury heldJeppesen lia-
ble on theories of negligence, breach of warranty and
strict products liability. The general verdict against Jep-
pesen was in the amount of $11,630,000. Shortly after
the verdict against Jeppesen, and before its own bench
trial, the United States settled with the plaintiffs for
$5,000,000, and was dismissed from the suit. World Air-
ways received $6,115,580.81 in a prejudgment interest
74 FORUM, supra note 73, at 276.
7 FORUM, supra note 73, at 277.
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award. After crediting the chartmaker with the
$5,000,000 settlement, the court entered a final judgment
for $12,785,580.81 against Jeppesen.76
On issues tangential to liability for a defective chart,
Jeppesen objected to the admission of the indemnity
agreement at trial. Although as a practical matter jury
knowledge of the agreement would probably be some-
what prejudicial, the plaintiffs prevailed on this point by
introducing the deal solely to attack the credibility of the
defense witnesses and to show the true relationship of the
various parties.77 Jeppesen's challenge to the prejudg-
ment interest award on the basis of uncertainty was also
denied on appeal.78
Jeppesen next contended that, in any event, strict liabil-
ity was inappropriate because the federal government
landing procedure was beyond its power to control. 79
The court concluded that it was inaccurate for Jeppesen
to extrapolate from the company's lack of direction over
the government that it had no control over what would
appear in the government's final published product.
Company policy and directives required the employees to
research any procedure for accuracy, completeness and
validity. 80 Additionally, Jeppesen had high-level liaison
with the FAA that had led to prior changes in other gov-
ernment flight procedures. 8' The court stated:
Accordingly, Jeppesen had both the ability to detect an er-
ror and a mechanism for seeking corrections. Under these
7c 767 F.2d at 1292.
71 Id. at 1292-93. Jeppesen failed to ask for a limiting instruction at trial on this
point and was denied relief from this oversight on appeal. The appellate court
also refused to order enforcement of the indemnity agreement, since that would
have to initiate in the claims court. The Ninth Circuit found that the trial was not
so fundamentally unfair that it deprived Jeppesen of due process of law, even
though the admitted indemnity agreement was not immediately enforceable by
the district court. Id. at 1293-94.
78 767 F.2d at 1298-99.
71, Id. at 1295-96. The breach of warranty theory was challenged only on the




circumstances, we reject Jeppesen's argument that the
Government's procedure was beyond Jeppesen's control.
More fundamentally, however, existing products liabil-
ity law is contrary to Jeppesen's position. Assuming that
the Government's instrument approach procedure was de-
fective, the literal requirements of section 402A are met.
Jeppesen's chart was a "product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user" within the meaning
of section 402A(1). Section 402A(2) (a) provides that strict
liability is appropriate even though "the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product." A seller is strictly liable for injuries caused by a
defective product even though the defect originated from
a component part manufactured by another party.... Ac-
cordingly, the appropriate focus of inquiry is not whether
Jeppesen caused the product to be defective, but whether
the product was in fact defective.8 2
Since the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the chart was defective, the appel-
late panel upheld the application of strict liability.83
The plaintiffs had admitted the negligence theory to the
jury as a failure to adequately test or warn. The
chartmaker argued that it had no duty to control the fed-
eral government in this area and no ability to alter the
improper and dangerous approach procedures.84
Both arguments miss the point .... Jeppesen can be held
liable for negligently failing to detect the defect in the
product that it marketed. If it had discovered the defect,
Jeppesen would have been required either to warn the
users of the chart or to refrain from selling the product.8 5
Finally, Jeppesen argued that it was "unfair to hold a
chart manufacturer strictly liable for accurately republish-
ing a government regulation. '8 6 The court of appeals
82 Id. at 1296 (citation omitted). For the full text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, see supra note 11.
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would have agreed with Jeppesen on this point if it were
relevant to the case:
This case, however, does not present that situation. Jep-
pesen's charts are more than just a republication of the
text of the government's procedures. Jeppesen converts a
government procedure from text into graphic format and
represents that the chart contains all necessary
information. 7
Since Jeppesen's charts were far more than a "mere re-
publication" of the basic government data, the appellate
court held that "Jeppesen assumed the responsibility for
insuring that the charts are not unreasonably dangerous
in their intended use."' 88 The judgment of the district
court was affirmed in all respects.89
CASES AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
As Brocklesby suggests, the federal government is a po-
tential defendant in accidents involving erroneous aero-
nautical charts.90 The United States itself independently
publishes many aerial maps and has been held liable for
mistakes and omissions in them. While negligence is the
only theory available against the United States, 9' and the
procedures under the Federal Tort Claims Act 92 require
special attention,93 there are nevertheless similarities to
the Jeppesen cases. For example, the claimant must still
87 Id. at 1298.
88 Id. The court concluded that Jeppesen's charts were not a privileged "public
journal" under CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(4). 767 F.2d at 1298.
- 767 F.2d at 1299.
o As in Brocklesby, the federal government may be independently liable for es-
tablishing an unsafe approach procedure in the first place. See, e.g., Foss v. United
States, 623 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980)(FAA negligent in publishing unsafe traffic
pattern to allow clearance of known ground hazards). But cf. Colorado Flying
Academy, Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Colo. 1981) (policy judg-
ment in establishing terminal control area design fell within discretionary function
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, precluding federal liability), aff'd, 724 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1984).
9, See, e.g., Wolfe v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Cal. 1985)(strict lia-
bility unavailable in swine flu vaccine case).
92 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982).
93 See, e.g., Abney, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 5 CAL. LAw. 31 (1985).
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establish the existence of a defect and proximate cause.
Further, the defendant will still deny all responsibility,
taking full advantage of any applicable Federal Tort
Claims Act defenses. 94
Medley v. United States95 presents the unique situation of
the federal government creating an unsafe flight route
and then preserving the initial destructive error in an aer-
onautical chart that contained no warning of the extreme
danger. Working with the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration cartographers, the FAA charted a
mountain pass route over Kearsarge Pass in the King's
Canyon area of the Sierras. Because of misleading eleva-
tion marking on the map and the treacherous terrain, sev-
eral planes using the FAA route became trapped in the
Center Basin blind canyon and crashed. The surviving
victims and their insurance carriers sued the federal gov-
ernment for wrongful death, personal injury, and prop-
erty damage.9 6
The plaintiffs asserted that the United States was negli-
gent in deciding to chart the mountain pass route at all, in
failing to place a warning on the resulting sectional chart,
in selecting where and how to depict the route on the
map, in not reviewing the chart for accuracy, and, finally,
in failing to promptly remove the route and warn unsus-
pecting pilots once the hazardous character of the route
was obvious.9 7 The United States moved for summary
judgment, contending that even if it had been negligent, it
was immune from suit under the "discretionary function
exception" to the Federal Tort Claims Act.98 This excep-
tion provides continued sovereign immunity to the United
States for:
94 See generally Annot., Liability of United States for Negligence of Person Other than Air
Traffic Controller in Connection with Aviation Control Operations, 47 A.L.R. FED. 85, 108-
11 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
9, 543 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
9o Id. at 1213-15.
97 Id. at 1216.
08 Id. at 1214. See Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 92, § 2680(a).
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Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused."9
In resolving the government's motion, District Judge
Aguilar first concluded that a "discretionary function"
was a decision involving the evaluation of such broad fac-
tors as the social, financial, economic, political, and public
safety aspects of a given policy or plan. A "non-discre-
tionary function" was an operational decision involving
the normal day-to-day affairs of the government, even
though some "discretion" may have been exercised. Dis-
trict Judge Aguilar was sensitive to the danger of intem-
perate interference with vital executive policy flexibility
and the capacity of the judiciary to effectively evaluate an
executive discretionary decision.100
The judge conceded that the initial decision to create a
route and place it on a sectional aeronautical chart was a
public safety policy choice falling within the bounds of the
discretionary function exception.' 0' He held that the
other allegedly negligent acts, however, were merely op-
erational, routine, and non-discretionary tasks related to
the adoption of the chart navigational route. 0 2 Holding
the government liable for hazards it had in fact created
was especially appropriate in this case:
These alleged acts of the government are clearly of an op-
erational character and so not within the discretionary
function exception to liability. The decision of the gov-
Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 92, § 2680(a). On the application of the
discretionary function exception to cases of this type, see Comment, Discretion and
the FAA: An Overview of the Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception of the
Federal Tort Claims Act to FAA Activity, 49J. AIR. L. & COM. 143, 155-59 (1983). See
also United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (latest comprehensive
analysis of discretionary function exception by the Supreme Court).
- 543 F. Supp. at 1218.
lo, Id. at 1218-19.
, 2 Id. at 1220-24.
AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
ernment to chart a mountain pass route over the Kear-
sarge Pass was what is known as a "Good Samaritan" act.
The government voluntarily undertook to assist pilots to
safely fly through the treacherous Kearsarge Pass area.
When the government undertakes such a Good Samaritan
task, thereby performing certain acts or functions and in-
ducing reliance thereon, the government has a duty to
perform the acts and functions with due care. When this
duty of care is discharged in a negligent manner, the gov-
ernment is guilty of negligence and it cannot escape liabil-
ity by invoking the discretionary function exception....
for there is not discretion to conduct discretionary opera-
tions negligently.10 3
District Judge Aguilar granted the government's summary
judgment motion as far as the initial decision to create a
route. He denied the rest of the motion and ordered the
case to proceed on the merits.10 4
The United States has been more fortunate in cases in-
volving crashes into power transmission lines which were
not marked on federal aeronautical charts. For instance,
in Allnutt v. United States 10 5 a pilot flying at a high speed up
the Osage River crashed after striking power lines which
were unmarked on the federal sectional aeronautical
chart. The court denied the resulting wrongful death suit,
holding that the chart contents conformed to the applica-
ble cartographic standards and that the pilot's contribu-
tory negligence was a complete bar in any event under the
controlling state law.' 0 6  Similarly, in Hahn v. United
States 107 the government was absolved from liability for
the crash of a plane that hit an electrical transmission
cable because it was operating below the statutory mini-
mum altitude. Since this particular line was accurately and
properly marked on the pertinent aeronautical charts in
accordance with reasonable FAA guidelines, the court
,os Id. at 1221-22 (citations omitted).
1- Id. at 1224.
,05 498 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
,-6 Id. at 842.
1 535 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.D. 1982).
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could find no proximate connection between the chart
and the crash.'0 8
Airplane collisions with guy wires have generated
mixed results. In Reminga v. United States'09 the FAA
promulgated a sectional map which falsely depicted the
location of a 1720 foot television tower on the south side
of a railroad line when it was actually on the other side.
Apparently depending on the chart in poor weather, a pi-
lot following the railroad tracks on the supposedly clear
and safe north side struck the tower support cables and
crashed. Applying the heart of the "Good Samaritan"
doctrine, the court held the United States responsible for
the tragedy:
Though not required by law to do so, when the FAA ar-
ranges for the publication of aeronautical navigation
charts and engenders reliance on them, it is required to
use due care to see that they accurately depict what they
purport to show. Failure to show the location of the tower
accurately rendered the United States liable for injury to
those who relied upon the chart." 0
The court reached the opposite result in Knight v. United
States,"' where a pilot using a slightly out-of-date sec-
tional map smashed into the guy wires of a new, un-
marked radio tower. Since the pilot had recklessly chosen
to fly in unsafe conditions of marginal visibility and could
not have reasonably expected a new structure to quickly
appear on an old chart, the court refused to find that the
map was the proximate cause of the crash." 2
Finally, plaintiffs have generally been successful in suits
over charts describing inaccurate runway lighting condi-
,o Id. at 136.
0o 448 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
11o 631 F.2d at 452.
... 498 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
112 Id. at 324. See also Fidelity Bank v. United States, 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,356
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (FAA not liable for plane crash into water tower not marked on
sectional chart where pilot error was sole cause).
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tions. Sullivan v. United States," 13 for example, involved the
crash of a plane attempting a night landing at an Alabama
airport. The appropriate sectional chart indicated that
landing lights would be illuminated all night or upon a
pilot requesting their illumination by circling the field.
The pilot circled twice, but the FAA field personnel on
duty failed to hear the plane and switch on the lights. The
plane, running low on fuel, crashed in a desperate landing
effort, with grievous injuries to both pilot and
passenger. "14
The victims sued the United States for the erroneous
chart and the negligence of the ground employees. The
government relied on the discretionary function excep-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act as a defense, to no
avail. 5 Without going into a "detailed analysis," the
court refused to allow the discretionary function shield,
holding that the preparation and publication of the chart
was a routine operation, negligently performed, with
proximate harm to the plaintiffs." t6 By undertaking to
supply reliable, essential information to pilots, the gov-
ernment became responsible for the consequences of its
negligence. '7
Almost the identical situation was replayed, although
with fatal results, in Murray v. United States.1 8 Relying
upon a federal aeronautical chart which falsely indicated
the runway lighting was on throughout the night without
request or that it was available to a pilot who circled the
field as a method of requesting lighting, a plane crashed
while repeatedly circling the Bryce Canyon, Utah airfield.
An FAA specialist finally turned on the lights after it was
113 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aft'd per curtiam, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir.
1969).
114 299 F. Supp. at 622-24.
"- 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) contains the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. The government also
tried to argue that the chart was a "misrepresentation" given immunity by federal
law, but the court did not accept that argument. 299 F. Supp. at 625.
- 299 F. Supp. at 625.
,17 Id. at 625-26.
118 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), aft'd, 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972).
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too late." t 9 The court brushed aside the discretionary
function defense and found that the negligence of the
United States in publishing incorrect charts proximately
caused the tragedy. 20
In Baird v. United States,' 2' however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the discretionary func-
tion defense. In that case a small plane landing at night on
a Kansas airfield overran the runway and crashed, with
two killed and one seriously injured. Contrary to infor-
mation in the Wichita sectional chart, the longest runway
was not the one illuminated. However, the true lighting
information was readily available to the pilot through
other sources. The Inter-Agency Air Cartographic Com-
mittee (IACC), a federal agency, had established the
chart's symbols. 22 The district court's dismissal of the
tort action was upheld on appeal under the discretionary
function exception:
Simply put, plaintiffs challenge the Wichita sectional chart
because it was too sketchy. This challenge thus goes to
the heart of the IACC's deliberative and judgmental activi-
ties in designing and approving the extent of detail to be
included in aeronautical sectional charts versus the extent
of detail left to be gleaned from other sources that the
prudent pilot can be expected to consult. Such design and
approval activities or choices by the Government fall
within the discretionary-function exception and are not ac-
tionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act.12 3
The most recent federal decision in this area also cen-
tered on the discretionary function exception to govern-
ment liability. In Weiss v. United States 124 a search and
119 327 F. Supp. at 837-39.
120 Id. at 841.
12 653 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). The dis-
trict court opinion was reported in 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,476 (D. Kan. 1979).
12 653 F.2d at 438, 441.
,23 Id. at 441. In a scholarly dissent, Circuit Judge Doyle argued that an incom-
plete chart was inherently misleading and unsafe and not within the ambit of dis-
cretion. Id. at 442-46.
124 787 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1986).
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rescue helicopter operating at about 150 feet above the
ground in a Colorado canyon struck an aerial tramway
cable which was part of an abandoned mining operation
partially located on federal land. The resulting crash seri-
ously injured the pilot and killed a passenger. The pilot
and his wife sued the United States for failing to depict
the aerial cable on the applicable sectional chart and for
neglecting to remove the defunct cable or attach warning
devices to it.125 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the United States on all claims, although the
Tenth Circuit later reversed and remanded on the issue of
possible landowner liability. 126
Writing the court's opinion concerning liability for the
chart, Circuit Judge Barrett agreed with the lower court's
determination that the discretionary function exception
controlled the outcome. He noted that the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) car-
tographers were following very general IACC standards
in preparing this particular chart. The IACC guidelines
spoke in hortatory language of "general guidance" and
"[u]tmost discretion" in selecting the quality and density
of detail to be portrayed. 127 Depiction of obstructions
such as aerial cables was mandatory only if they were 200
feet or more in height. The IACC recommended the de-
piction of shorter obstructions if they were in a "critical"
location and if chart congestion allowed the detail. 12
Faced with vague IACC rules granting the mapmakers
in this case broad judgmental flexibility on whether to de-
pict the 150-foot high cable, Circuit Judge Barrett had lit-
tle difficulty in finding a permissible exercise of discretion
in the preparation of the chart. Since the NOAA cartogra-
phers were performing a government function under non-
mandatory rules, the court properly upheld the discre-
tionary function defense and affirmed the summary judg-
,2-5 Id. at 520-21.
26 Id. at 521, 524-27.
,.7 Id. at 522.
128 Id.
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ment in favor of the United States.1 29
CONCLUSION
In any aircraft mishap in which a misleading aeronauti-
cal chart is implicated, a cause of action may exist against
the chartmaker, the provider of the erroneous informa-
tion, or both. In the case of a private map manufacturer, it
is now clear that a mass-produced aeronautical chart is in-
deed a "product" for purposes of strict liability. If the
map is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user and proximately causes harm, the manufacturer
will be held to answer in tort. This will be true even if the
producer has used all possible care in the preparation and
dissemination of the chart, and even if the chart is merely
a faithful graphic depiction of data supplied by the na-
tional government. The plaintiff may also employ negli-
gence and warranty theories, although those causes of
action are more unwieldy and difficult to prove.
Several consequences flow from the judicial willingness
to hold private chartmakers strictly accountable for their
products. The mapmakers will naturally incur large ex-
penses from the defense and occasional payment of claims
arising from defective charts. Considering the recent per-
formance of the insurance industry, insurance coverage
will become more expensive and more difficult to obtain.
It may become necessary for chartmakers to self-insure,
form an independent insurance carrier, or seek some sort
of legislative shield from some liabilities. These addi-
tional costs will be borne by the direct and indirect con-
sumers of aerial maps. On the positive side, the
aeronautical map manufacturers will undoubtedly redou-
ble their already vigorous effort to produce accurate, reli-
able and useful charts. With a modicum of good fortune,
the end result will be safer, albeit more expensive,
product.
As discussed in this article, the United States may also
1' Id. at 523-24.
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be liable for promulgating unsound aerial charts.'3 0
Although negligence is the only allowable recovery theory
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, plaintiffs have pre-
vailed in suits alleging injury caused by unsafe federal
charts. On occasion, the government has successfully de-
nied responsibility by demonstrating that no proximate
cause relationship existed between the suspect chart and
the crash.'3' The primary mechanism for avoiding liabil-
ity, however, is the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. Under that statutory exception to federal culpabil-
ity, there will be no government liability even for a proxi-
mately-resulting crash if the government mapmakers have
sufficient administrative leeway on how to depict or even
whether to portray features on an aeronautical chart and
their choice produces a misleading, defective and danger-
ous map. 13 2
The discretionary function defense is by no means a
complete bar to suit against the United States. The initial
decision to create an aeronautical map may be entirely an
executive discretionary decision. Once the map is made,
however, it must truly display those items chosen for de-
piction. Thus, if a transmission tower is shown to the east
of a railroad when it actually lies to the west, the govern-
ment would be responsible for a misled pilot who hits the
tower. Moreover, any mandatory regulations or statutes
regarding whether or how to depict features on a chart
must be followed in order to avoid liability under the
FTCA.
The structure of the Federal Tort Claims Act has some
interesting implications for this field. Since the FTCA is a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress could
create a special exemption for the products of federal
chartmakers. An alternative method would be to make all
of the rules governing the creation of government maps
entirely discretionary. This would still allow liability for
',' See supra notes 89-123 and accompanying text.
'.' See supra notes 107-108 and 111-112 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
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features incorrectly portrayed, but would narrow the
scope of federal responsibility. While there may be some
movement in that direction, it does not seem likely that
government cartographers will be given carte blanche to
place whatever they please on their charts. If discretion is
broadened, the added immediate dangers will be borne
by air travellers and others in the vicinity of a crash. If
government liability results, the financial costs will belong
to the public. As with the private mapmakers, the most
desirable outcome will be the compensation of the victims
of government negligence and the creation of better
maps.
